Poore soule in this thy flesh, what do'st thou know. Thou know'st thy selfe so little, as thou know'st not, How thou did'st die, nor how thou wast begot.
death liberates the soul from the body." 9 She contends that the poem "is framed as a narrative progress through the heavenly spheres to represent a journey through knowledge and self-understanding." 10 Is there some way in which we might accommodate each of these arguments?
One might begin by observing that the generally accepted view that the poem contains Donne's "hortatory…. admonition" 11 to his own soul implies an acknowledgment that the soul, as depicted in the poem, stands in need of such an address. 12 A soul already uninterested in worldly things, ardently desirous of their heavenly counterparts, and accepting of the view of death as a happy liberation (in accordance with the stance recommended by Donne's church) 13 would presumably not require the added impetus of hortatory admonition. The Second Anniversarie mingles the language of exhortation and congratulation, suggesting an understanding of the regenerate soul as still in need of exhortation to overcome its aversion to death, but capable of celebrating the benefits conferred by death as well (l. 448; ll. 65-66). Existing criticism has not fully taken note of the resistance to celebration within the poem, which is why Targoff's insistence upon it is so valuable. 14 While I do not think that her argument puts into question the view that the poem celebrates the progress of the soul from the "encumbrances" associated with inhabiting a body to "freedom from them after death" 15 (even while making it clear that such freedom entails the reunion of the body and soul) it invites us to pay more attention to fact that hortatory admonition implies resistance in the addressee.
Here, I argue that the poem may be read as both a portrait of resistance to the parting of body and soul in death, as well as an account of the soul's enfranchisement and growth in self-knowledge through the same event. The progress of the regenerate soul towards heaven is represented as being at once reluctant and willing, and thus "long" as well as "short," or, as Donne would have it, "long-short" (SA l.219). I pursue my claim through a discussion of his two-fold account of self-knowledge: that which consists of knowledge of oneself in one's this-worldly incarnation, and that which entails knowledge of the self at the moment of death as well as of "thy self, beyond thy self… what thou shalt be in the next world." 16 Calvin called "our natural aversion to leaving this life" 18 and the normative Christian desire for heaven. 19 First, I introduce the notion of self-knowledge beyond the self, before turning to a very short comparative discussion of Donne and Joseph Hall. I then briefly discuss the depiction of the "In-mate soule" in The First Anniversarie before proceeding to a longer account of The Second Anniversarie.
'Thyself Beyond Thyself'
On April 26, 1625, shortly after the death of King James, Donne preached a sermon at Denmark House before the king's body was removed for burial. He instructs the auditory to forego the attempt to know themselves through a consideration of honors, offices, pedigree, posterity, and alliances: "Get beyond thine own circle; consider thy selfe at thine end, thy own death, and then Egredare, Goe further than that, 23 Both Donne and Hall draws from the Pauline understanding of residence in the body as a matter of inhabiting a temporary lodging (see II Corinthians 5:1-9). Both take as their object the Augustinian figure of the soul that is decidedly less than cheerful about the prospect of death 24 and needs to be shamed by an appeal to the example of others not similarly afflicted with a want of cheerfulness, tempted with descriptions of how easeful death will be, or otherwise persuaded to convert its tendency to tremble at the thought of leaving its short-term lodging into a cheerful anticipation of entering into its heavenly home. Hall implies that the tendency of some Christians to tremble at death suggests unclear thinking as well as cowardice. 25 For Donne, the tendency of the regenerate soul to tremble with fear at the thought of death (and what comes with it) is more ambiguous; such fear may be filial fear that is fueled by love or servile fear that flies from judgment. In his account, the latter, while inferior to the former, is not necessarily shameful. 26 To Donne's mind, God is served by both fears and, as he puts it in a sermon from 1621, even the "feare of hell gets us heaven." 27 Since Donne views one sort of fear (the fear of the Lord) as being "the most noble, the most courageous, the most magnanimous, not affection but vertue in the world" (as he puts it in a sermon from 1624) he cannot recommend the wholesale substitution of a sense of security (which has its own dangers) for fear. 28 Furthermore, to consider oneself properly at the moment of death and beyond is to encounter fear, for as Donne puts it in the same sermon, "fear respects the future." 29 At least notionally, the admission of the fear of the Lord into natural fear prompts a shift of attention away from "the afflictions of this life" towards "the joys of heaven." 30 In The First Anniversarie, the world has fallen into such an unnatural state, that it does not even know that it is "rotten at its hart" (FA l. 242). Ignorance of sickness prevents access to even servile fear (which in this instance, would be salutary). Here, then, Donne's task is to impart to readers such limited knowledge of their sickness as they are capable of bearing, and to point out that the picture of the decaying world painted therein "should more affright, than pleasure thee" (FA l. 372). The fear that "should" be felt by readers participating in the project of praising Elizabeth Drury's virtuous soul (and attempting to act in a manner befitting it) is consistent with their own status as regenerate "weedless Paradises… /Which of themselves produce no venomous sinne, / Except some forraine Serpent bring it in" (ll. 82-84). These Adamic "new creatures" of a "new world" (l.76) face danger in the form of excessive confidence, for "strength it selfe by confidence grows weak" (l. 86). They must be told of the fearsome "dangers and diseases of the old" (l. 88) in order to further their knowledge of the "true worth" (l. 90) of things. Readers are to fear forsaking their status as new creatures, but also, it would seem, the danger of becoming part of and like to the infected world from which they emerged (ll. 245-6). The old world is necessarily to be known, but only in order that it might be rightly feared.
The Inmate and the Active Soul
In the beginning of The First Anniversarie, the speaker posits the existence of two different sorts of souls: an active soul, which sees, judges, follows and praises "worthinesse" by deeds, on the one hand, and, on the other, an "In-mate soul" (l.6) which does none of these things:
When that rich soule which to her Heauen is gone, Whom they all celebrate, who know they haue one, (For who is sure he hath a soule, vnlesse It see, and Iudge, and follow worthinesse, And by Deedes praise it? He who doth not this, May lodge an In-mate soule, but tis not his.) [ll. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] In suggesting that Elizabeth's departed soul can only be celebrated by "all who know they haue [a soul]" ( ll. 1-2), the poem does not refer to all who simply have a soul, but to all those who know that they have a soul by the fact that it sees, judges, and follows worthiness through praising it "by Deedes." Those who do not may contain an other, lesser sort of soul, but to serve as a lodging for a soul is not the same as to possess one.
The notion of an "In-mate soul" is related to, but not identical with the Orphic, Pythagorean, and Platonic notion of the soul as the prisoner of the body. It is Donne's version of the related Roman, Rabbinic, and Christian notion of the soul as itinerant lodger, guest, and traveler. 31 In Donne's time, an "inmate" was a tenant or temporary lodger in a residence that belonged to someone else, or a stranger. 32 An inmate has no title to (and hence, no lasting claim upon) the structure in which he resides. Yet
Elizabeth's life on this earth is itself to be understood as "progresse time" (l.7) preceding her arrival in the "standing house" of heaven, suggesting an image of a royal journey (which connotes residence in a world that is one's "own" realm by virtue of one's rule over it), but also the biblical notion of Christian life as a matter of living in a world in which one can never be truly at home (see I Peter 2:11). In a limited sense, one might say that the soul in the temporary lodging of body 33 is roughly homologous with the inmate Christian in the world, in which he or she may be understood as both active, selfpossessed sovereign and "visiting stranger." 34 While the speaker notes the gap between the inmate soul and the active soul, he suggests that the likelihood of that that gap being closed is very slight. Only those who actively pursue goodness through action have imaginative access to the "sight" of Elizabeth's soul: "now no other way there is / But goodness, to see her, whom all would see, / All must endeauor to be as good as shee" (ll. [16] [17] [18] . In one sense, the world may be thought to gain by her death rather than to lose from it, because her death has made action aimed at the good an imperative for "all." But this action-oriented account of the soul that praises worthiness by "Deedes," and confirms its own existence through the exercise of its faculties would seem to comport ill with a world in which the conditions of the active pursuit of goodness have been generally imperiled. The world as a whole has been deprived of accurate self-knowledge: "So thou, sicke worlde, mistak'st thy selfe to bee / Well, when thou'rt in a Letargee" (ll. [23] [24] .
One of the lessons that the reader is to learn from the poem's anatomy of the world's corpse is as follows:
That here there is nothing to enamor thee And that, not only faults in inward parts, Corruptions in our braines, and in our harts, Poysoning the fountains, where our actions spring Endanger vs: but that if euery thing Be not done fitly'nd in proportion.
To satisfie wise, and good, lookers on, (Since most men be as such as most thinke they bee) They're lothsome too, by this Deformitee. For good and well must in our actions meete: Wicked is not much worse than indiscreete. [ll.328-338]
Being "good" in a transpolitical sense is not the same as being "well" (i.e., well-regarded and honored) in the eyes of "lookers on" and the minds of "most." Donne offers two formulations of the notion that the regard of others (or the anticipation of such regard) is partially determinative of the moral status of actions: in the first formulation, that which is not done to the satisfaction of "wise and good lookers on" is "lothsome." The second, parenthetical formulation is much more radical because it suggests that most men are as good as "most" others (not just wise and good others) take them to be. If this were the case, the public face of virtue would amount to virtue itself, and acquiring selfknowledge would entail learning how to act within the context of custom (which Donne elsewhere describes as "second nature" 35 ) and public opinion, rather than attempting to discover what one would be like apart from it.
In The First Anniversarie, Donne considers the issue of the soul's self-knowledge primarily (although not exclusively) from the perspective of a world that has been "embarr'd" from commerce with heaven (l.400). At stake, then, in the poem's exploration of the faculties of the soul as they have been corrupted in the wake of Elizabeth's death, are not only defects in the inward springs of action, but the nature of the communities within which souls judge and praise worthiness by deeds. In the end, the poem does not identify the project of acquiring self-knowledge as a means of allowing the inmate soul even preliminary access to the privileges of self-ownership and self-knowledge in this life. The illness of the natural world notwithstanding, however, there is still nourishment to be had through the consumption of "that supernaturall food, Religion" (l. 188). But the only prospect of complete enfranchisement for the inmate soul is death: "For though the soule of man / Be got when man is made, 'tis born but than / When man doth die. Our body's as the wombe, / And as a mid-wife death directs it home" (ll.451-454).
The Soul on Earth and in Heaven
From Upon turning to The Second Anniversarie, we find that this minimally functional economy is no longer functioning at all: "a new Deluge, and of Lethe flood, / Hath drown'd vs all, All haue forgot all good… (ll. [27] [28] . Since the memory (the faculty of the soul which could retain the image of "all good") has been permanently ruined or temporarily washed out, the soul has been deprived of the goal for the sake of which future actions might be performed and the standard by which its attempts to be good could be measured. The water-logged soul lacks not only knowledge of its own powers and purpose, but also knowledge of where it should direct its gaze, and where it stands.
Here, there is no place to stand as such. Due to the "Deluge / grosse and generall" (l.30), the world is not just weak and ailing but dead, having suffered a flood akin to that of Because the dead world is an unstable, watery expanse, there is no question of being still or at rest in it. Yet there is also no means of acting in the same manner in which one could in the world before the deluge.
The speaker initially resists announcing that the world is dead (which, in this account, would mean that it was something like a world of bodies in motion without souls) but he then proceeds to suggest the likeness of the world's struggle in its present condition to two entities (a ship with its sail down and a beheaded body) that are still moving despite the absence of any indwelling force within them that would account for that movement, or render it intelligible. In presenting an image of the beheaded body attempting to call back -and then to "step forth to meet" its departed soul, the speaker tentatively attempts to assign human intention and desire to this post-mortem convulsion by saying that it was "as though he beckon'd, and cal'd backe his Soule" (l.14), and that the headless corpse "seemes to reach and, and to step forth to meet / His Soule" (ll. [16] [17] . Ultimately, however, the speaker concludes that these motions are not part of a dramatic sequence, "but as Ice, which crackles at a thaw: / Or as a Lute, which in moist weather, rings / Her knell alone, by cracking of her strings" (ll. [17] [18] [19] [20] . The crackling of ice in a thaw and the cracking of strings in the damp are not simulacrae of action, but rather, figures of the failure of material substances to offer such resistance to the elements as might have sufficed to maintain their forms. Finally, the speaker is forced to acknowledge that what "we saw" (l.17) was merely "motion in corruption" (l.21).
The poem encourages the striving, "insatiate" soul to long for something other than mere life, and to look "vpward, that's toward her" (ll.65). After glancing up, the soul's gaze is directed back down to the world, which now appears as "fragmentary rubbidge… not worth a thought" (ll.82-83). The soul is now invited to begin thinking about death. Indeed, it has no other option: the soul can think about death or think about something (the world) that is less than nothing. The flurry of initial directives to the soul The first instruction to the soul in Line 85 to "Thinke" about death inaugurates a series of (highly conventional) cognitive adjustments concerning the soul's conceptions Donne's use of forensic terms pertaining to disseizin and inheritance (title, "long possession," right, power and Place") invites questions about the nature of the "title to heaven" held by "a good man" who pleads "long possession" in this respect. 38 In land law, "long possession" is claimed by those who lack clear title to a piece of property that Thus, despite his legitimate claim to possession of heaven, the good man's soul is, with respect to his exercise of his "right, power and Place" as permanent resident of heaven, in a position akin to that of "In-mate soul" with respect to its dwelling on earth.
The latter, however, can only plead "long possession," while the former has a range of other bases for his claim. Nonetheless, he still has to claim "long possession." Here, then
we find some suggestion of a situational overlap between the soul of the "good man" and the inmate soul. Yet this suggestion does not wholly prepare us for the section following the passage from which I have just quoted: In thinking on "thy selfe," the soule is told to think of itself as having been conceived in "a sinke" (l.158), 39 an occupant of a poor prison (l.173), and then having matured into a dweller in a "poore Inne" (l.175). The speaker emphasizes the utter susceptibility of the soul to infection by the body, and, once infected, its inability to escape from the source of its taint. The soul that is told that it is just a lodger in a "a poore Inne / A Prouince Pack'd vp in two yards of skinne" (ll.175-176). The soul has no lasting title to the "poore Inne"
or "Prouince" in which it dwells; it is only an occupant in a structure it does not own.
Here, then, Donne conflates the respective plights of the inmate and the active soul that he took pains to separate in the earlier poem. The inertia of the former and the activity of the latter become two ontological moments within the trajectory of one soul (which extends through life and death), rather than two different sorts of soul belonging to different persons (as they were in The First Anniversarie). There, Donne distinguished two sorts of souls on the basis of their respective self-knowledge. Here, there are only inmate souls (i.e., those with no lasting title to the bodies they inhabit) who have titles to heaven which they cannot yet exercise. Donne adds another layer of complexity to his use of the topos of the soul as temporary lodger by merging it with that of the soul as prisoner.
There would initially appear to be no prospect of acting --or thinkingone's way out of the imprisoned soul's predicament, since it is pointedly posited as a constitutional condition, rather than a potentially corrigible defect in thinking, judging, or acting. Donne pointedly abstracts from questions of the soul's choice, desire, and will to inhabit the body by emphasizing the involuntary nature of its residence; the soul could not refuse the body in the beginning, and it can't "leaue it now." But the very fact that the soul is being instructed to "think" implies that it has the capacity to reflect upon its own condition, and thus, to gain self-knowledge about its worldly predicament from within what it "shalt bee" in heaven, and given a means of preparing to exercise its title to heaven in anticipation of its permanent residence there after death. What is so striking here is that he combines one account of the soul in which questions about the soul's will or desire have no bearing on its predicament (since it is a prisoner of the body) with another account of the soul in which questions about will and desire are of central importance (since the speaker's attempt to persuade the soul of the benefits of heaven aims to direct the will and cultivate the soul's desire for heaven). Having created a trajectory that spans from imprisonment on earth to enfranchisement in heaven, Donne is then faced with the challenge of showing how the imprisoned soul might be prodded into overcoming its resistance to the knowledge of "thy self beyond thy self," a task which he approaches by attempting to convince the soul that heavenly self-knowledge entails a fulfillment of its earthly equivalent, rather than an abandonment of it.
The speaker's radical disparagement of embodied existence on earth, and the sort of knowledge of the soul that can be obtained strictly within the confines of such an existence is directed at the goal of deflating excessive confidence, as well as expanding the scope of self-knowledge to include the soul at the moment of its death and beyond.
The vehicle for this deflation and expansion is thinking. This first instruction to the soul At first, the focus is on the gun being discharged and "flowen, / In peeces" (ll.
181-82)
. Surprisingly, the flight of the bullet/soul is not depicted as being propelled by the force of the discharge; rather, it is somehow self-determined: "the bullet is his owne / And freely flies" (ll.182-183). But while it has been mysteriously endowed with the power of self-propulsion and the capacity for free flight, the soul is not yet possessed of positive liberty in the sense of the liberty to achieve some particular desired end. Now, the notion of enfranchisement and liberty is represented in terms of a chick being hatched from an egg shell, which has a very different connotation than the image of the soul as self-propelled bullet. A chick, unlike a bullet, does not shoot forth from its shell with force and speed; rather it emerges from its long, slow struggle to be born in a state of This progress is aimed at building up connective tissue between heaven and earth:
So by the soule doth death string Heauen and Earth, For when our soule enjoyes this her third birth, (Creation gave her one, a second, grace,) Heauen is as neare, and present to her face, As colours are, and objects, in a roome, Where darknesse was before, when Tapers come. [ll.214-219] This third birth has not one but two midwives: death and thinking. Heaven is brought near through thinking, a process which is at once self-propelled and outwardly compelled (and guided) by the cumulative pressure of the repeated commands to "thinke." The poem invokes the memory of Elizabeth in order to "aduance these thoughts" (l.220) about the work that death is doing to promote commerce between heaven and earth.
Standing in the way of this advancement is the obstacle of the soul's defective self-knowledge. If the soul is to move on its own and move freely, it cannot rely upon external pressure to push it forward; it must have internal knowledge about its own path, including potential obstacles it might encounter along the way. So pressing is the problem of defective self-knowledge that the poem suggests that if the soul is going to be as ignorant in heaven as it is on earth it wouldn't make much difference even if it did, in dying, change its "roome" from the "living Tombe" of earth to the more capacious chamber of heaven: "But t'were little to haue chang'd our roome, / If, as we were in this our liuing Tombe / Oppress'd with ignorance…" (ll.251-253).
The poem directs our attention to the soul's lack of knowledge about "how thou at first camest in" (l.257) to the body and became poisoned with sin (l.258) and by "what way thou art made immortall" (l.260). The speaker tells the soul that it lacks a standard by which to adjudicate between the opinions of others concerning the composition of the body and its parts. He shifts from "thou" to "we" in asking "What hope haue we to know our selues, when wee / Know not the least things, which for our vse bee?" (l.280.
Collective attempts to acquire knowledge about the world are no more promising than individual attempts to acquire knowledge about the self. An opinion belonging to "one soule" (l.267) is not corrected by another soul; either soul could be right (or neither).
The poem suggests that if there is no readily available means by which correct judgment pertaining to the thoughts of others concerning "the least things which for our vse bee" (l.280) then there is even less hope that we can be brought "to know our selues" (l.279). The celebration of the comprehensive sort of knowledge that is available to the soul in heaven does not begin until the soul has moved beyond the sphere of "sense, and
Fantasy" (l.292) into the "watch-towre" (l.294) from which vantage point not only the self, but "all things" can be seen "despoyld of fallacies" (l.295). There, as in heaven, to see (l.295) is simply to know: "In Heauen thou straight know'st all" (l.299).
Although the poem's movement is directed towards the resurrection of "earthly bodies more celestiall" (l.493) in heaven, it insists upon death as the necessary cognitive, theological, and ontological prelude to that reunion. Through death, the thinking subject is to be restored as an embodied subject and made capable of conversation with others. In heaven, thinkers have ready access to all the thoughts in "all Libraries" in their own thoughts, but they still have cause to look outside of themselves. Knowledge of oneself, however complete, does not cancel out the desire to receive knowledge from others;
heavenly souls rejoice at the arrival of other souls and that "Ioy of a soules arriuall neere decaies; / For that soule euer ioyes, and euere staies" (ll.489-490). The process of thinking oneself into heaven, as it were, is not aimed at attaining either the isolate splendor of absolute self-sufficiency or dissolution into thought thinking itself. Even in anticipation, the soul must think of itself beyond itself -through others, and in conversation with them -if it would seek to know itself at all. 
